Editors’ Note:  For those of you who like to get something you can use from blog posts, attached here is a Form PACA Nondischargeability Complaint for a PACA seller against a party that controlled a PACA buyer, where such controlling party later files for bankruptcy.  Although, in light of the case discussed below, there is an open legal question of whether violations of the PACA trust by an individual in control of a PACA buyer result in a non-dischargeable debt under Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.  To see some of our other coverage of PACA issues, a personal favorite of Leah’s and Mark’s, see here and here.

In Coosemans Miami v. Arthur (In re Arthur), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida held last week that individuals in control of a PACA trust may still receive a bankruptcy discharge of debts arising from their breach

Weird things happen in bankruptcy court. All you high-falutin Chapter 11 jokers out there, cruise down to the bankruptcy motions calendar one day.  You will see sovereign citizen arguments, the increasing problem of unprepared pro se claimants relying on bogus bankruptcy petition preparers, and occasionally, the subject of this post – Chapter 13 debtors seeking court authority to buy a sweet Camaro.

Debtors’ Counsel:  Your Honor, it has 20 inch rims!

The Court:  But is it an IROC?

In In re Jordan, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina addressed a way righteous motion by Chapter 13 debtors to purchase a Camaro.  Not just any Camaro, but the

Happy 2018!  We at The Bankruptcy Cave have been itching to write about the Cherry Growers Chapter 11 case – which really is ground-breaking – but the holidays, life, and yes, work for clients too, all just got in the way.  But with each passing week, the case stayed on our minds.  So now that time permits, here is the writeup – and see below for the remarkable significance of the case.

In re Cherry Growers (now reported at 576 B.R. 569, Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2017), is a garden-variety produce-related bankruptcy case.  (Ha ha, “garden-variety” produce, get it?)  The Debtor bought produce and sold it to others, in addition to conducting other food distribution activities.  When the Debtor filed for bankruptcy, there was the typical push-and-pull between a lender secured by the Debtor’s inventory and a/r, and a supplier claiming a trust interest in those same assets, protected by the

Ok, if your attention span is anything like ours, all this wonky stuff about the ins and outs of the Affordable Care Act (or “ObamaCare,” as most of us know it) causes your eyes to glaze over and makes your mind wander to simpler topics, like who will win Dancing with the Stars, whether the Will & Grace reboot can make it, or how Luke may soon be revealed as the most evil Jedi of all.

But trust us, faithful reader, and you can, in about three short minutes, become a whiz on last week’s latest change to ObamaCare, which we think will lead to a lot more healthcare-related restructuring activity. So here is the 411 on last week’s termination of ObamaCare’s so-called “CSR Subsidies,” and its impact on our precarious, bankruptcy-prone, healthcare marketplace.  All presented to you in easy-to-follow FAQs!

We are all very used to (and very bored of) the on-going debate of what actually constitutes “the media” or “legitimate news.”  In most instances, this sort of debate pits exclusive, Columbia-educated, “proper” journalists against those who have large on-line followings and eschew any association with a Dickensian-era newspaper.  Or, as one story recently summarized it, “Corporate Media Freaks Out at Possibility of Breitbart, Infowars Being Allowed to Ask Questions [in White House Press Conferences],” full story here.

This debate has now, surprisingly, found its way into our arcane little bankruptcy world, with Murray Energy Corporation v. Reorg Research, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op. 27036 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct., Feb. 14, 2017) (Edmead, J.).  It started with a distressed company called Murray Energy establishing an on-line “data room”

We at the Bankruptcy Cave are not very surprised by the ruling yesterday in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp.  The Supreme Court in Jevic reviewed a Bankruptcy Court’s decision to approve a settlement (with a distribution of proceeds that contravened the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme) in conjunction with dismissing the bankruptcy case of the Chapter 11 debtor Jevic Holding Corp. According to the Bankruptcy Court, because the distributions would occur pursuant to a “structured dismissal” rather than a confirmed plan, the failure to follow the creditor priority scheme did not bar approval.  In short, the Bankruptcy Court did not confirm a plan of reorganization for the Chapter 11 debtor, in which sufficient creditor support can re-order some of the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.  Nor did the Bankruptcy Court convert Jevic’s Chapter 11 case to Chapter 7, in which the Code’s creditor priority scheme can never be changed.

Another bankruptcy trustee catches another hapless college unaware.  In Roach v. Skidmore College (In re Dunston), Bankr. S.D. Ga. (Jan 31, 2017), a trustee appears to win the next battle of “bankruptcy estates v. child’s college,” ruling that an insolvent parent who paid the college tuition of an adult child made a fraudulent transfer to the college.  Thus, the unsuspecting college will likely have to return the tuition to the parent’s bankruptcy estate.

The theory is simple (albeit unsettling to some).  Under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code (and applicable state law, as a back-up), if any debtor makes a transfer to a third party while insolvent, and does not receive reasonably equivalent value in return, the debtor’s bankruptcy trustee may reclaim such transfer for

A decision rendered during the sometimes peaceful interlude between Christmas and New Year’s is worth reading, and heeding.  Hurston v. Anzo (In re Hurston), Adv. Proc. No. 15-2026 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 27, 2016) is a helpful reminder to anyone representing lenders or creditors which are hell-bent-for-leather to pursue a non-dischargeability claim against a debtor that submits a false written statement (e.g., a personal financial statement) to obtain credit.  Often, in the fervor of the start of a bankruptcy case, the creditor (and its lawyer) will make great hay from the fact that a debtor may have lied in a pre-petition credit application, or forbearance agreement, or other written medium.  However, the facts of Hurston show that a creditor (and its lawyer) should pause, take a breath, and critically evaluate whether the creditor actually relied on the pre-petition writing from the debtor, and whether that creditor’s reliance was also, in fact, reasonable.  If

We all remember The Devil and Daniel Webster – the Devil comes to collect a seven year old debt (secured by Jabez Stone’s soul), only to be foiled by the great trial lawyer Daniel Webster – thanks to a skilled litigator, the old debt is forgiven!

But that isn’t the only example of years’ old debt becoming a real matter of contention.  Earlier today, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on an issue that (a) is pretty important in the world of consumer debt collection, and (b) makes some folks pretty darn furious. The issue is this:  if you file a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case, and you know such claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, are you committing a “misleading” or “unfair” practice under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)?  (Coverage of the case and